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Labor Law—Strike Assessments Not Periodic Dues.—NLRB v. Food Fair
Stores. 1—After having been partly unsuccessful in collecting a uniformly-
imposed strike assessment to be paid to fellow members on strike against
another market chain, the Retail Food Clerks Union requested the Food
Fair Corporation to execute a check-off and to discharge employees who
failed to pay.2 Under the union shop agreement then in force, the company
attempted to collect the funds and threatened to discharge nonpaying em-
ployees. In affirming the decision of the National Labor Relations Board,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit HELD: Assessments of any type
are not "periodic dues" within Sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) of the Labor
Management Relations Acts even when uniformly levied among all members
of the union; hence the action of both the union and the company, under
these same sections, constituted an unfair labor practice.
In the Food Fair case the circuit court was faced with the problem of
effectuating protections from the possible inequities of a closed shop granted
workers by sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2), and concurrently permitting
orderly operation of labor unions and its corollary, the necessary maintenance
of a union treasury (also implicitly recognized and protected by these same
sections). As will be seen, the court felt bound by existing NLRB rulings
while rejecting both attempts to distinguish these decisions from the principal
case and to rationalize a more permissive interpretation of the term "periodic
dues." Consequently, the court was unable to completely harmonize the
somewhat conflicting anti-closed shop and anti-free rider policies, and the
problem raised by this case remains unsolved.
Section 8(a) (3) allows union shop agreements. It provides that union
membership may be required within thirty days of employment, and prohibits
an employer from denying employment to any person whom he reasonably
believes was not allowed union membership for any reason other than for
nonpayment of "periodic dues and initiation fees." Section 8(b) (2) goes on
to limit union activity in that any attempts to have an employee discharged
for any other reason than nonpayment of "periodic dues and initiation fees
uniformly required" shall constitute an unfair labor practice.
From the outset the NLRB has differentiated between the terms "peri-
odic dues" and "assessments." Failure to pay assessments for nonattendance
at union meetings,4 for refusal to participate in union activities such as
picketing,5 or for failure to meet financial obligations on time,° have all been
held invalid grounds for discharge under union shop agreements. The ra-
tionale in these decisions has been that the assessments are not uniformly
levied in conformity with the express wording of the act and that such a
charge is punitive, not a revenue measure. These cases may be distinguished
1 307 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1962).
2 The contract then in force provided for a union shop, and employees had given
the required written authority to the company for the check-off of "membership dues."
3 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (3) & (b) (2) (1958) (Taft-Hartley Act).
4 Electric Auto-Lite Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1073, 27 L.R.R.M. 1205 (1950), enf'd, 196
F.2d 500 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 823 (1952).
5 Eclipse Lumber Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 464, 28 L.R.R.M. 1329 (1951), enf'd, 199 F.2d
684 (9th Cir. 1952).
6 The Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 918, 35 L.R.R.M. 1159 (1954).
434
CASE NOTES
from the present situation, then, in that they do not dispose of the question
of an assessment which has been uniformly charged to all members for the
express purpose of raising revenue, Fines and penalties, the union concedes,
are clearly outside the term "periodic dues" 7
 for these may be a basis for
discrimination against individual workers contrary to the protection of the
act. The argument continues that if every member of a union is to pay an
assessment he is actually paying a fee which can be distinguished from the
sanctioned periodic dues only because it is not divided up into periodic pay-
ments; the money could be collected then by raising the dues rather than by
levying an assessment. This attempt to draw a distinction between types of
assessments (individually assessed fines and penalties as opposed to generally
applied charges) is rejected by the court because of "a pattern revealing
consistency in the holding of the Board that assessments in any of their
various forms may not be included within the term 'periodic dues.' " 8
The legislative history of section 8(a) (3) indicates that the problem
of uniformly required assessments was considered in the light of the history
of Cecil B. De Mille,9
 who was ejected from a union and subsequently black-
balled from radio for a refusal to pay such an assessment earmarked for
political purposes. The main problem in this area at which 8(a)(3) was
directed was the forcing of a member to contribute to a political cause with
which he might not agree.'° The Board has made the questionable deduction
that in attacking the result in De Mille, Congress has also attacked uniform
assessments in a union security provision. 11
Reference was made by the present court to a Seventh Circuit case 12
in which an employee was discharged for failure to pay union dues. Here the
court assumed without discussion that if the discharge had been for non-
payment of assessments it was illegal, and the case, was decided on the ques-,
tion whether an employee was obliged to continue to tender dues after they
had been refused for nonpayment of an assessment.
The court is apparently putting the greatest weight on a Ninth Circuit
decision, NLRB v. I.A.M. Guided Missile Lodge 1254, 13
 which deals with
a discharge for failure to pay a generally levied assessment. In this case an
employee was dropped from union membership for nonpayment of dues and
Brief for Respondent Union, p. 4.
8
 307 F.2d at 16.
0
 De Mille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 17 A.C.A. 480, 175 P.2d 851 (1946),
aff'd, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769, cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1947).
10
 Now here was a man called upon to put up a contribution to fight a cause
in which he did not believe and because he refused to pay the assessment made
on him, he was kicked around and is now unable to pursue his work. Such a
situation is intolerable and must be corrected.
93 Cong. Rec. 4135 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ellender). Cf. International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
11
 It is important to note that the assessment in the De Mille case was not
discriminatory; that is, it was uniformly required of all members. Hence, it
appears that Congress intended to eliminate the nonpayment of assessments as
such, as a basis for discharge of employees.
International Harvester Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 730, 733, 28 L.R.R.M. 1337, 1338 (1951).
12
 NLRB v. Die & Tool Makers Lodge No. 113, 231 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 833 (1956).
13 241 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1957).
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assessments and was subsequently discharged from his employment in con-
formity with a union shop contract which provided that as a condition of
employment any member of the union "must pay initiation fees, monthly
dues, and general assessments."" The Board contended first that to enforce
a general assessment was illegal, and second that the inclusion of the in-
valid term was so interwoven with the valid terms "initiation fees and monthly
dues" that all these provisions were infected. In ruling against the Board on
this latter point the court in the Guided Missile case merely assumed that
employment cannot be conditioned on payment of special assessments. In-
asmuch as the court ruled that the employee could be discharged in any
event, for nonpayment of dues, the issue as to whether assessments are "dues"
did not receive full consideration. Thus we have for the first time express
consideration on the Court of Appeals level concerning the possible extension
of the term "periodic dues" to encompass general assessments under section
8(a)(3).
The court further considered the effect of the somewhat similar language
in Sections 302" and 8(a) (3) of the Labor Management Relations Act.
Section 302 prohibits under criminal penalty the payment of anything of
value to the union by the employer excepting, inter alia, "money deducted
from the wages of employees in payment of membership dues in a labor
organization." In construing this section of the act, the Justice Department
held that assessments were within the definition of "membership dues" and
hence could be legitimately checked-off." The Board acquiesced in this
judgment as a "matter of comity,"" but held in the International Harvester"
case that section 302 was capable of broader interpretation than section
8(a) (3) with which it was then concerned. Inasmuch as an employee must
voluntarily authorize a check-off of an assessment, he may, from time to
time, withhold the authority 2 0 Hence, under section 302, the worker was
protected from capricious and arbitrary assessment. The court in the instant
case held that the distinction between sections 8(a) (3) and 302 was valid,
laying special emphasis on the criminal sanctions imposed under section 302
in that they represented quite another purpose than those expressed in
sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2). Section 302 provides strong protection from
sweetheart contracts, pay-offs, etc., while sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) at-
tempt to avoid the problems of a closed shop.
14 Id. at 696.
15 LMRA, § 302, 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 186(c) (1958).
16 Supra note 15.
17 Opinion of the Justice Department, 22 L.R.R.M. 46 (1948).
18 William Wolf Bakery, 122 N.L.R.B. 630, 43 L.R.R.M. 1147 (1958). The Board's
willingness to conform to the holding of the Justice Department was based on the fact
that section 302 was enforceable by the Justice Department. Thus any collateral effect of
the check-off provisions of a contract, i.e., as affecting the validity of a contract to
serve as an election bar, should be governed by that department's ruling. The court
seems correct in not extending this rationale to sections within the sole jurisdiction of
the Board.
19 Supra note 11. Here the Board ruled that a contract provision denying union
membership and requiring dismissal from a job for nonpayment of general assessments
was invalid.
20 Opinion of the Justice Department, supra note 17, at 47.
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The similarity of the amendments to the Railway Labor Act 21 and
section 8 (a) (3) also were considered by the court, but were rejected on the
ground that assessments were included in the union shop provisions of the
Railway Labor Act amendments because of unique conditions in the rail
unions wherein they are traditionally supported by assessments rather than
dues.22
The court's reliance on the distinction between "periodic dues" and
"assessments" as these words apply to sections 8(a) (3) and 8 (b) (2) and
"regular dues" under section 302 seems to have left the union in an
anomalous situation. If an assessment uniformly levied among all the mem-
bers of a union is not encompassed by the term "periodic dues," then the
very union employees for whom the protection in section 8(a) (3) was de-
signed could fall victim to free riders who may refuse to meet their fair
share of union duties. This argument was dismissed by the court on the
ground that internal sanctions are still left to a union to enforce payment
of assessments as long as no attempt is made to interfere with a member's
employment. While this device may be sufficient in some cases, this need not
be so in every instance. In the instant case the court does not consider
specifically what sanctions might be applied or their efficacy. Moreover, it
would seem that the usual methods available such as ostracism or denial of
health and social benefits could only be effective, if at all, over a long period
of time, rather than immediately when the funds are needed. Thus, if a
union is threatened by the trend of negotiations and its treasury is depleted,
it may well be totally hamstrung in its bargaining if it is unable immediately
to raise a strike fund. It would seem that the only sure way to maintain a
union treasury at a "safe" level would be to keep regular dues at a constantly
high rate in excess of usual needs. The probable result of such a policy is an
even greater hardship on the union members than the remedy afforded by
the Food Fair decision. One answer would be to allow general and uniformly
levied assessments, as opposed to fines and penalties, in construing section
8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) as is permitted by the amendments to the Railway
Labor Act. There can be no doubt that a decision contrary to the Food Fair
holding would add to labor's bargaining power. This consideration, how-
ever, was never pressed by any of the litigants or the court, all of whom
dealt solely with strictly legalistic points of construction rather than any
socio-economic question.
In Worthington Pump & Mach. v. Douds23 the court pointed out that
the LMRA was designed with the interplay of labor and management in
21
 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (a) (1958). The applicable phrases
of the act read:
... carriers . . . shall be permitted—(a) to make agreements, requiring as a
condition of continued employment, that within sixty days . . . all employees
shall become members of the labor organization. . . . Provided, That no such
agreement shall require such condition of employment with respect to employees
.. to whom membership was denied or terminated for any reason other than
failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and as-
sessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required . . . .
22 Machinists v. Street, supra note 10, at 765-66.
23 97 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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mind, and further noted that the act was intended to strengthen manage-
ment's position at the bargaining table. 24
 In view of the instant court's
basing its decision on a distinction between dues and assessments, yet failing
to show why this point is determinative, some reference to the overall pur-
pose of the act could and should have been made. However, considering the
Board's position and the Court of Appeals' decisions in the Guided Missile
Lodge and Food Fair cases, with the implicit reluctance to add to the bar-
gaining power of the union in construing 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) of the act,
it appears that any solution will have to come from Congress.
STEPHEN M. RICHMOND
Labor Law—Superseniority Policies—Relevance of Employer's Motive.
—Erie Resistor Corp. v. NLRB. 1—During an economic strike, the Com-
pany, after a sharp decline in business and loss of important orders, hired
replacements including new employees and returning strikers, and offered
tenure to replacements over strikers returning upon settlement of the
strike as an inducement to cross picket lines. The Company established a
superseniority policy to implement its assurances of tenure under which
the replacements were to receive twenty years added to their regular
length of service. After settlement of the strike, the Company filled still-
vacant places with returning employees according to seniority. Several
months later a number of employees were laid off for economic reasons,
including some recalled strikers whose seniority was now comparatively
low because of the superseniority plan. The Union's complaint that the
preferential seniority plan was an unfair labor practice was recommended
for dismissal as the evidence did not support a determination that the
Company's action was prompted by an improper motive. The Board ruled,
however, that the adoption of preferential seniority was inherently dis-
criminatory, the Company's motive being wholly irrelevant. 2 In denying
enforcement of the Board's cease and desist order, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit HELD: The implementation by the Company of a
superseniority plan, although discriminatory, is not a violation of section
8(a) (3) 3 of the National Labor Relations Act unless motivated by a desire
to discourage or encourage membership in a labor organization. The adoption
of preferential seniority to assure tenure to replacements is proper if the
Company is motivated solely by necessity to protect and continue its
business.
24 Id. at 660.
1 303 F.2d 359 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 83 Sup. Ct. 48 (1962).
2 132 N.L.R.13. 621, 48 L.R.R.M. 1379 (1961).
3 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)
(1958), as amended by Pub. L. 86-257, § 201(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(3) (i) (1959), provides:
Section 8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment .. - to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . .
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